Verify an attestation on the supplied container image
Verify an attestation on an image by checking the claims against the transparency log.
cosign verify-attestation [flags]
cosign verify-attestation --key <key path>|<key url>|<kms uri> <image uri> [<image uri> ...]
# verify cosign attestations on the image
cosign verify-attestation <IMAGE>
# verify multiple images
cosign verify-attestation <IMAGE_1> <IMAGE_2> ...
# additionally verify specified annotations
cosign verify-attestation -a key1=val1 -a key2=val2 <IMAGE>
# (experimental) additionally, verify with the transparency log
COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL=1 cosign verify-attestation <IMAGE>
# verify image with public key
cosign verify-attestation --key cosign.pub <IMAGE>
# verify image attestations with an on-disk signed image from 'cosign save'
cosign verify-attestation --key cosign.pub --local-image <PATH>
# verify image with public key provided by URL
cosign verify-attestation --key https://host.for/<FILE> <IMAGE>
# verify image with public key stored in Google Cloud KMS
cosign verify-attestation --key gcpkms://projects/<PROJECT>/locations/global/keyRings/<KEYRING>/cryptoKeys/<KEY> <IMAGE>
# verify image with public key stored in Hashicorp Vault
cosign verify-attestation --key hashivault:///<KEY> <IMAGE>
# verify image with public key stored in GitLab with project name
cosign verify-attestation --key gitlab://[OWNER]/[PROJECT_NAME] <IMAGE>
# verify image with public key stored in GitLab with project id
cosign verify-attestation --key gitlab://[PROJECT_ID] <IMAGE>
# verify image with public key and validate attestation based on Rego policy
cosign verify-attestation --key cosign.pub --type <PREDICATE_TYPE> --policy <REGO_POLICY> <IMAGE>
# verify image with public key and validate attestation based on CUE policy
cosign verify-attestation --key cosign.pub --type <PREDICATE_TYPE> --policy <CUE_POLICY> <IMAGE>
--allow-insecure-registry whether to allow insecure connections to registries. Don't use this for anything but testing
--attachment-tag-prefix [AttachmentTagPrefix]sha256-[TargetImageDigest].[AttachmentName] optional custom prefix to use for attached image tags. Attachment images are tagged as: [AttachmentTagPrefix]sha256-[TargetImageDigest].[AttachmentName]
--certificate string path to the public certificate
--certificate-chain string path to a list of CA certificates in PEM format which will be needed when building the certificate chain for the signing certificate. Must start with the parent intermediate CA certificate of the signing certificate and end with the root certificate
--certificate-email string the email expected in a valid Fulcio certificate
--certificate-oidc-issuer string the OIDC issuer expected in a valid Fulcio certificate, e.g. https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com or https://oauth2.sigstore.dev/auth
--check-claims whether to check the claims found (default true)
--enforce-sct whether to enforce that a certificate contain an embedded SCT, a proof of inclusion in a certificate transparency log
-h, --help help for verify-attestation
--k8s-keychain whether to use the kubernetes keychain instead of the default keychain (supports workload identity).
--key string path to the public key file, KMS URI or Kubernetes Secret
--local-image whether the specified image is a path to an image saved locally via 'cosign save'
-o, --output string output format for the signing image information (json|text) (default "json")
--policy strings specify CUE or Rego files will be using for validation
--rekor-url string [EXPERIMENTAL] address of rekor STL server (default "https://rekor.sigstore.dev")
--sk whether to use a hardware security key
--slot string security key slot to use for generated key (default: signature) (authentication|signature|card-authentication|key-management)
--type string specify a predicate type (slsaprovenance|link|spdx|vuln|custom) or an URI (default "custom")
--output-file string log output to a file
-t, --timeout duration timeout for commands (default 3m0s)
-d, --verbose log debug output
- cosign - A tool for Container Signing, Verification and Storage in an OCI registry.