Verify all signatures of images specified in the manifest
Verify all signature of images in a Kubernetes resource manifest by checking claims against the transparency log.
cosign manifest verify [flags]
cosign manifest verify --key <key path>|<key url>|<kms uri> <path/to/manifest>
# verify cosign claims and signing certificates on images in the manifest
cosign manifest verify <path/to/my-deployment.yaml>
# additionally verify specified annotations
cosign manifest verify -a key1=val1 -a key2=val2 <path/to/my-deployment.yaml>
# (experimental) additionally, verify with the transparency log
COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL=1 cosign manifest verify <path/to/my-deployment.yaml>
# verify images with public key
cosign manifest verify --key cosign.pub <path/to/my-deployment.yaml>
# verify images with public key provided by URL
cosign manifest verify --key https://host.for/<FILE> <path/to/my-deployment.yaml>
# verify images with public key stored in Azure Key Vault
cosign manifest verify --key azurekms://[VAULT_NAME][VAULT_URI]/[KEY] <path/to/my-deployment.yaml>
# verify images with public key stored in AWS KMS
cosign manifest verify --key awskms://[ENDPOINT]/[ID/ALIAS/ARN] <path/to/my-deployment.yaml>
# verify images with public key stored in Google Cloud KMS
cosign manifest verify --key gcpkms://projects/[PROJECT]/locations/global/keyRings/[KEYRING]/cryptoKeys/[KEY] <path/to/my-deployment.yaml>
# verify images with public key stored in Hashicorp Vault
cosign manifest verify --key hashivault://[KEY] <path/to/my-deployment.yaml>
--allow-insecure-registry whether to allow insecure connections to registries. Don't use this for anything but testing
-a, --annotations strings extra key=value pairs to sign
--attachment string related image attachment to sign (sbom), default none
--attachment-tag-prefix [AttachmentTagPrefix]sha256-[TargetImageDigest].[AttachmentName] optional custom prefix to use for attached image tags. Attachment images are tagged as: [AttachmentTagPrefix]sha256-[TargetImageDigest].[AttachmentName]
--certificate string path to the public certificate
--certificate-chain string path to a list of CA certificates in PEM format which will be needed when building the certificate chain for the signing certificate. Must start with the parent intermediate CA certificate of the signing certificate and end with the root certificate
--certificate-email string the email expected in a valid Fulcio certificate
--certificate-oidc-issuer string the OIDC issuer expected in a valid Fulcio certificate, e.g. https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com or https://oauth2.sigstore.dev/auth
--check-claims whether to check the claims found (default true)
--enforce-sct whether to enforce that a certificate contain an embedded SCT, a proof of inclusion in a certificate transparency log
-h, --help help for verify
--k8s-keychain whether to use the kubernetes keychain instead of the default keychain (supports workload identity).
--key string path to the public key file, KMS URI or Kubernetes Secret
--local-image whether the specified image is a path to an image saved locally via 'cosign save'
-o, --output string output format for the signing image information (json|text) (default "json")
--rekor-url string [EXPERIMENTAL] address of rekor STL server (default "https://rekor.sigstore.dev")
--signature string signature content or path or remote URL
--signature-digest-algorithm string digest algorithm to use when processing a signature (sha224|sha256|sha384|sha512) (default "sha256")
--sk whether to use a hardware security key
--slot string security key slot to use for generated key (default: signature) (authentication|signature|card-authentication|key-management)
--output-file string log output to a file
-t, --timeout duration timeout for commands (default 3m0s)
-d, --verbose log debug output
-y, --yes skip confirmation prompts for non-destructive operations
- cosign manifest - Provides utilities for discovering images in and performing operations on Kubernetes manifests