From eba2c10886e4970d0288644fa253145bb2af0577 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Martin Holst Swende Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2021 16:19:48 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] cmd/geth: update vulnerability testdata (#23252) --- cmd/geth/testdata/vcheck/vulnerabilities.json | 55 ++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/cmd/geth/testdata/vcheck/vulnerabilities.json b/cmd/geth/testdata/vcheck/vulnerabilities.json index 36509f95a98ad..92de0c9ccc70c 100644 --- a/cmd/geth/testdata/vcheck/vulnerabilities.json +++ b/cmd/geth/testdata/vcheck/vulnerabilities.json @@ -52,13 +52,16 @@ "check": "Geth\\/v1\\.9\\.(7|8|9|10|11|12|13|14|15|16).*$" }, { - "name": "GethCrash", + "name": "Geth DoS via MULMOD", "uid": "GETH-2020-04", "summary": "A denial-of-service issue can be used to crash Geth nodes during block processing", - "description": "Full details to be disclosed at a later date", + "description": "Affected versions suffer from a vulnerability which can be exploited through the `MULMOD` operation, by specifying a modulo of `0`: `mulmod(a,b,0)`, causing a `panic` in the underlying library. \nThe crash was in the `uint256` library, where a buffer [underflowed](https://github.com/holiman/uint256/blob/4ce82e695c10ddad57215bdbeafb68b8c5df2c30/uint256.go#L442).\n\n\tif `d == 0`, `dLen` remains `0`\n\nand https://github.com/holiman/uint256/blob/4ce82e695c10ddad57215bdbeafb68b8c5df2c30/uint256.go#L451 will try to access index `[-1]`.\n\nThe `uint256` library was first merged in this [commit](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/commit/cf6674539c589f80031f3371a71c6a80addbe454), on 2020-06-08. \nExploiting this vulnerabilty would cause all vulnerable nodes to drop off the network. \n\nThe issue was brought to our attention through a [bug report](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/issues/21367), showing a `panic` occurring on sync from genesis on the Ropsten network.\n \nIt was estimated that the least obvious way to fix this would be to merge the fix into `uint256`, make a new release of that library and then update the geth-dependency.\n", "links": [ "https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth_security_release/", - "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-jm5c-rv3w-w83m" + "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-jm5c-rv3w-w83m", + "https://github.com/holiman/uint256/releases/tag/v1.1.1", + "https://github.com/holiman/uint256/pull/80", + "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/21368" ], "introduced": "v1.9.16", "fixed": "v1.9.18", @@ -66,5 +69,51 @@ "severity": "Critical", "CVE": "CVE-2020-26242", "check": "Geth\\/v1\\.9.(16|17).*$" + }, + { + "name": "LES Server DoS via GetProofsV2", + "uid": "GETH-2020-05", + "summary": "A DoS vulnerability can make a LES server crash.", + "description": "A DoS vulnerability can make a LES server crash via malicious GetProofsV2 request from a connected LES client.\n\nThe vulnerability was patched in #21896.\n\nThis vulnerability only concern users explicitly running geth as a light server", + "links": [ + "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-r33q-22hv-j29q", + "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/21896" + ], + "introduced": "v1.8.0", + "fixed": "v1.9.25", + "published": "2020-12-10", + "severity": "Medium", + "CVE": "CVE-2020-26264", + "check": "(Geth\\/v1\\.8\\.*)|(Geth\\/v1\\.9\\.\\d-.*)|(Geth\\/v1\\.9\\.1\\d-.*)|(Geth\\/v1\\.9\\.(20|21|22|23|24)-.*)$" + }, + { + "name": "SELFDESTRUCT-recreate consensus flaw", + "uid": "GETH-2020-06", + "introduced": "v1.9.4", + "fixed": "v1.9.20", + "summary": "A consensus-vulnerability in Geth could cause a chain split, where vulnerable versions refuse to accept the canonical chain.", + "description": "A flaw was repoted at 2020-08-11 by John Youngseok Yang (Software Platform Lab), where a particular sequence of transactions could cause a consensus failure.\n\n- Tx 1:\n - `sender` invokes `caller`.\n - `caller` invokes `0xaa`. `0xaa` has 3 wei, does a self-destruct-to-self\n - `caller` does a `1 wei` -call to `0xaa`, who thereby has 1 wei (the code in `0xaa` still executed, since the tx is still ongoing, but doesn't redo the selfdestruct, it takes a different path if callvalue is non-zero)\n\n-Tx 2:\n - `sender` does a 5-wei call to 0xaa. No exec (since no code). \n\nIn geth, the result would be that `0xaa` had `6 wei`, whereas OE reported (correctly) `5` wei. Furthermore, in geth, if the second tx was not executed, the `0xaa` would be destructed, resulting in `0 wei`. Thus obviously wrong. \n\nIt was determined that the root cause was this [commit](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/commit/223b950944f494a5b4e0957fd9f92c48b09037ad) from [this PR](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/19953). The semantics of `createObject` was subtly changd, into returning a non-nil object (with `deleted=true`) where it previously did not if the account had been destructed. This return value caused the new object to inherit the old `balance`.\n", + "links": [ + "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-xw37-57qp-9mm4" + ], + "published": "2020-12-10", + "severity": "High", + "CVE": "CVE-2020-26265", + "check": "(Geth\\/v1\\.9\\.(4|5|6|7|8|9)-.*)|(Geth\\/v1\\.9\\.1\\d-.*)$" + }, + { + "name": "Not ready for London upgrade", + "uid": "GETH-2021-01", + "summary": "The client is not ready for the 'London' technical upgrade, and will deviate from the canonical chain when the London upgrade occurs (at block '12965000' around August 4, 2021.", + "description": "At (or around) August 4, Ethereum will undergo a technical upgrade called 'London'. Clients not upgraded will fail to progress on the canonical chain.", + "links": [ + "https://github.com/ethereum/eth1.0-specs/blob/master/network-upgrades/mainnet-upgrades/london.md", + "https://notes.ethereum.org/@timbeiko/ropsten-postmortem" + ], + "introduced": "v1.10.1", + "fixed": "v1.10.6", + "published": "2020-12-10", + "severity": "High", + "check": "(Geth\\/v1\\.10\\.(1|2|3|4|5)-.*)$" } ]