ZIP: 155
Title: addrv2 message
Owners: Daira Hopwood <daira@electriccoin.co>
Credits: Wladimir J. van der Laan
Zancas Wilcox
Status: Proposed
Category: Network
Created: 2021-08-13
License: BSD-2-Clause
Discussions-To: <https://github.com/zcash/zips/issues/542>
Pull-Request: <https://github.com/zcash/zips/pull/543>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.1
The term "network upgrade" in this document is to be interpreted as described in ZIP 200.2
The terms "Testnet" and "Mainnet" are to be interpreted as described in section 3.11 of the Zcash Protocol Specification3.
"P2P network" means the Zcash peer-to-peer network.
uint8, uint16, and uint32 denote unsigned integer data types of the corresponding length (8, 16, or 32 bits respectively).
This document proposes a new P2P message to gossip longer node addresses over the P2P network. This is required to support new-generation onion addresses, I2P, and potentially other networks that have longer endpoint addresses than fit in the 128 bits of the current addr message.
Tor v3 onion services are part of the stable release of Tor since version 0.3.2.9. They have various advantages compared to the old v2 onion services, among which better encryption and privacy4. These services have 256-bit addresses and thus do not fit in the existing addr message (unchanged from Bitcoin 5), which encapsulates onion addresses in OnionCat IPv6 addresses.
Other transport-layer protocols such as I2P have always used longer addresses. This change would make it possible to gossip such addresses over the P2P network, so that other peers can connect to them.
The addrv2 message is defined as a message where the command field is (NUL-padded) "addrv2". It is serialized in the standard encoding for P2P messages. Its format is similar to the current addr message format described in 6, with the difference that the fixed 16-byte IP address is replaced by a network ID and a variable-length address, and the services format has been changed to7.
This means that the message contains a serialized vector of the following structure:
Bytes Name Data Type Description 4 timeuint32Time that this node was last seen as connected to the network. A time in Unix epoch time format. variesservicesCompactSizeService bits. A CompactSize-encoded bit field that is 64 bits wide. 1 networkIDuint8Network identifier. An 8-bit value that specifies which network is addressed. variessizeAddrCompactSizeThe length in bytes of addr.sizeAddraddruint8[sizeAddr]Network address. The interpretation depends on networkID. 2 portuint16Network port. If not relevant for the network this MUST be 0.
One message can contain up to 1,000 addresses. Clients MUST reject messages with more addresses.
Field addr has a variable length, with a maximum of 512 bytes (4096 bits). Clients MUST reject messages with a longer addr field, irrespective of the network ID.
The list of reserved network IDs is as follows:
Network ID Enumeration Address length (bytes) Description 0x01IPV44 IPv4 address (globally routed internet) 0x02IPV616 IPv6 address (globally routed internet) 0x04TORV332 Tor v3 onion service address 0x05I2P32 I2P overlay network address 0x06CJDNS16 Cjdns overlay network address
Network ID 0x03 is intentionally not assigned. In BIP 1558 it was assigned to Tor v2 onion addresses, but those addresses are no longer supported by the latest Tor client code, and MUST NOT be used once this ZIP is deployed.
Clients SHOULD gossip valid, potentially routable addresses from all known networks, even if they are currently not connected to some of them. That could help multi-homed nodes and make it more difficult for an observer to tell which networks a node is connected to.
Clients MUST NOT gossip addresses from unknown networks, because they have no means to validate those addresses and so can be tricked to gossip invalid addresses.
Clients MUST reject messages that contain addresses that have a different length than specified in this table for a specific network ID, as these are meaningless.
The IPV4 and IPV6 network IDs use addresses encoded in the usual way for binary IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in network byte order (big endian).
According to the spec9, version 3 .onion addresses are encoded as follows:
onion_address = base32(PUBKEY || CHECKSUM || VERSION) + ".onion"
CHECKSUM = H(".onion checksum" || PUBKEY || VERSION)[:2] // first 2 byteswhere:
PUBKEYis the 32-byte Ed25519 master pubkey of the onion service;VERSIONis a one-byte version field (default value0x03);".onion"and".onion checksum"are constant strings;CHECKSUMis truncated to two bytes before inserting it inonion_address;H()is the SHA3-256 cryptographic hash function.10
Tor v3 addresses MUST be sent with the TORV3 network ID, with the 32-byte PUBKEY part in the addr field. As VERSION will always be 0x03 in the case of v3 addresses, this is enough to reconstruct the onion address.
Like Tor, I2P naming uses a base32-encoded address format11.
I2P uses 52 characters (256 bits) to represent the full SHA-256 hash, followed by .b32.i2p. The base32 encoding does not include "=" padding characters.
I2P addresses MUST be sent with the I2P network ID, with the decoded SHA-256 hash as address field.
Cjdns addresses are simply IPv6 addresses in the fc00::/8 range 12. They MUST be sent with the CJDNS network ID. They are encoded in network byte order (big endian) as for the IPV6 network ID.
Support for this specification is signalled by peer protocol version 170015 (on both Testnet and Mainnet). Note that this is the same peer protocol version that signals support for NU5 on Mainnet13.
Nodes that have not negotiated peer protocol version 170015 or higher on a given connection, MUST NOT send addrv2 messages on that connection.
A node that has negotiated peer protocol version 170015 or higher on a given connection, MAY still send addr messages on the connection, and MUST handle received addr messages as it would have done prior to this ZIP.
This ZIP is closely based on BIP 15514, with the following changes:
- Deployment: support for the
addrv2message is signalled by advertising a peer protocol version of 170015 or higher, not by sending asendaddrv2message. This is motivated by a desire to avoid an exponential explosion in the space of possible feature configurations in a given peer-to-peer connection. In Zcash, unlike Bitcoin, the space of such configurations is effectively constant no matter how many peer-to-peer protocol changes are made, because nodes that do not support a given peer protocol version will drop off the network over time if they do not support the latest Network Upgrade. The feature configuration for a given connection is also established at version negotiation, and cannot change after that point without reconnecting. Other peer-to-peer protocol changes ported from the Bitcoin peer-to-peer protocol, for example theMSG_WTXinv type defined in ZIP 23915, have taken the same approach to signalling. - No Network ID for Tor v2 onion addresses: the Tor network is expected to have removed support for these addresses in the timeframe for deployment of this ZIP.
- Clients MUST, rather than SHOULD, reject
addrv2messages with more than 1,000 addresses. Making this a consistent requirement promotes interoperability. - Clients MUST NOT, rather than SHOULD NOT, gossip addresses from unknown networks.
- Clients MUST, rather than SHOULD, reject messages that contain addresses that have a different length than specified for a known network ID, or a length greater than the 512-byte maximum for an unknown network ID.
TBD.
This ZIP is closely based on BIP 15516, written by Wladimir J. van der Laan. Zancas Wilcox ported the implementation for Zcashd.
Acknowledgements for BIP 155:
- Jonas Schnelli: change
servicesfield toCompactSize, to make the message more compact in the likely case instead of always using 8 bytes. - Gregory Maxwell: various suggestions regarding extensibility.