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full_stack.rs
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full_stack.rs
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// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
// history.
//
// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.
//! Test that no series of bytes received over the wire/connections created/payments sent can
//! result in a crash. We do this by standing up a node and then reading bytes from input to denote
//! actions such as creating new inbound/outbound connections, bytes to be read from a connection,
//! or payments to send/ways to handle events generated.
//! This test has been very useful, though due to its complexity good starting inputs are critical.
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode::deserialize;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
use bitcoin::hashes::HashEngine as TraitImportEngine;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
use lightning::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
use lightning::blinded_path::payment::ReceiveTlvs;
use lightning::chain;
use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen};
use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
use lightning::chain::chainmonitor;
use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use lightning::sign::{InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, EntropySource, NodeSigner, SignerProvider};
use lightning::events::Event;
use lightning::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelDetails, ChannelManager, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
use lightning::ln::peer_handler::{MessageHandler,PeerManager,SocketDescriptor,IgnoringMessageHandler};
use lightning::ln::msgs::{self, DecodeError};
use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
use lightning::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use lightning::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
use lightning::offers::invoice_request::UnsignedInvoiceRequest;
use lightning::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, OnionMessagePath};
use lightning::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph};
use lightning::routing::utxo::UtxoLookup;
use lightning::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
use lightning::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
use lightning::util::test_channel_signer::{TestChannelSigner, EnforcementState};
use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
use lightning::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
use crate::utils::test_logger;
use crate::utils::test_persister::TestPersister;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Message, PublicKey, SecretKey, Scalar, Secp256k1, self};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::{RecoverableSignature, Signature};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::schnorr;
use std::cell::RefCell;
use hashbrown::{HashMap, hash_map};
use std::convert::TryInto;
use std::cmp;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64,AtomicUsize,Ordering};
use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
#[inline]
pub fn slice_to_be16(v: &[u8]) -> u16 {
((v[0] as u16) << 8*1) |
((v[1] as u16) << 8*0)
}
#[inline]
pub fn slice_to_be24(v: &[u8]) -> u32 {
((v[0] as u32) << 8*2) |
((v[1] as u32) << 8*1) |
((v[2] as u32) << 8*0)
}
#[inline]
pub fn slice_to_be32(v: &[u8]) -> u32 {
((v[0] as u32) << 8*3) |
((v[1] as u32) << 8*2) |
((v[2] as u32) << 8*1) |
((v[3] as u32) << 8*0)
}
#[inline]
pub fn be64_to_array(u: u64) -> [u8; 8] {
let mut v = [0; 8];
v[0] = ((u >> 8*7) & 0xff) as u8;
v[1] = ((u >> 8*6) & 0xff) as u8;
v[2] = ((u >> 8*5) & 0xff) as u8;
v[3] = ((u >> 8*4) & 0xff) as u8;
v[4] = ((u >> 8*3) & 0xff) as u8;
v[5] = ((u >> 8*2) & 0xff) as u8;
v[6] = ((u >> 8*1) & 0xff) as u8;
v[7] = ((u >> 8*0) & 0xff) as u8;
v
}
struct InputData {
data: Vec<u8>,
read_pos: AtomicUsize,
}
impl InputData {
fn get_slice(&self, len: usize) -> Option<&[u8]> {
let old_pos = self.read_pos.fetch_add(len, Ordering::AcqRel);
if self.data.len() < old_pos + len {
return None;
}
Some(&self.data[old_pos..old_pos + len])
}
}
struct FuzzEstimator {
input: Arc<InputData>,
}
impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
//TODO: We should actually be testing at least much more than 64k...
match self.input.get_slice(2) {
Some(slice) => cmp::max(slice_to_be16(slice) as u32, 253),
None => 253
}
}
}
struct FuzzRouter {}
impl Router for FuzzRouter {
fn find_route(
&self, _payer: &PublicKey, _params: &RouteParameters, _first_hops: Option<&[&ChannelDetails]>,
_inflight_htlcs: InFlightHtlcs
) -> Result<Route, msgs::LightningError> {
Err(msgs::LightningError {
err: String::from("Not implemented"),
action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
})
}
fn create_blinded_payment_paths<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
&self, _recipient: PublicKey, _first_hops: Vec<ChannelDetails>, _tlvs: ReceiveTlvs,
_amount_msats: u64, _secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
unreachable!()
}
}
impl MessageRouter for FuzzRouter {
fn find_path(
&self, _sender: PublicKey, _peers: Vec<PublicKey>, _destination: Destination
) -> Result<OnionMessagePath, ()> {
unreachable!()
}
fn create_blinded_paths<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
&self, _recipient: PublicKey, _peers: Vec<PublicKey>, _secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
) -> Result<Vec<BlindedPath>, ()> {
unreachable!()
}
}
struct TestBroadcaster {
txn_broadcasted: Mutex<Vec<Transaction>>,
}
impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
fn broadcast_transactions(&self, txs: &[&Transaction]) {
let owned_txs: Vec<Transaction> = txs.iter().map(|tx| (*tx).clone()).collect();
self.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().extend(owned_txs);
}
}
#[derive(Clone)]
struct Peer<'a> {
id: u8,
peers_connected: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
}
impl<'a> SocketDescriptor for Peer<'a> {
fn send_data(&mut self, data: &[u8], _resume_read: bool) -> usize {
data.len()
}
fn disconnect_socket(&mut self) {
assert!(self.peers_connected.borrow()[self.id as usize]);
self.peers_connected.borrow_mut()[self.id as usize] = false;
}
}
impl<'a> PartialEq for Peer<'a> {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
self.id == other.id
}
}
impl<'a> Eq for Peer<'a> {}
impl<'a> std::hash::Hash for Peer<'a> {
fn hash<H : std::hash::Hasher>(&self, h: &mut H) {
self.id.hash(h)
}
}
type ChannelMan<'a> = ChannelManager<
Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<TestChannelSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, &'a FuzzRouter, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
type PeerMan<'a> = PeerManager<Peer<'a>, Arc<ChannelMan<'a>>, Arc<P2PGossipSync<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<dyn Logger>>>, Arc<dyn UtxoLookup>, Arc<dyn Logger>>>, IgnoringMessageHandler, Arc<dyn Logger>, IgnoringMessageHandler, Arc<KeyProvider>>;
struct MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
manager: Arc<ChannelMan<'a>>,
monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<TestChannelSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
handler: PeerMan<'a>,
peers: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
funding_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
txids_confirmed: HashMap<Txid, usize>,
header_hashes: Vec<(BlockHash, u32)>,
height: usize,
max_height: usize,
blocks_connected: u32,
}
impl<'a> MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
pub fn new(peers: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
manager: Arc<ChannelMan<'a>>,
monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<TestChannelSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
handler: PeerMan<'a>) -> Self {
MoneyLossDetector {
manager,
monitor,
handler,
peers,
funding_txn: Vec::new(),
txids_confirmed: HashMap::new(),
header_hashes: vec![(genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash(), 0)],
height: 0,
max_height: 0,
blocks_connected: 0,
}
}
fn connect_block(&mut self, all_txn: &[Transaction]) {
let mut txdata = Vec::with_capacity(all_txn.len());
for (idx, tx) in all_txn.iter().enumerate() {
let txid = tx.txid();
match self.txids_confirmed.entry(txid) {
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
e.insert(self.height);
txdata.push((idx + 1, tx));
},
_ => {},
}
}
self.blocks_connected += 1;
let header = create_dummy_header(self.header_hashes[self.height].0, self.blocks_connected);
self.height += 1;
self.manager.transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, self.height as u32);
self.manager.best_block_updated(&header, self.height as u32);
(*self.monitor).transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, self.height as u32);
(*self.monitor).best_block_updated(&header, self.height as u32);
if self.header_hashes.len() > self.height {
self.header_hashes[self.height] = (header.block_hash(), self.blocks_connected);
} else {
assert_eq!(self.header_hashes.len(), self.height);
self.header_hashes.push((header.block_hash(), self.blocks_connected));
}
self.max_height = cmp::max(self.height, self.max_height);
}
fn disconnect_block(&mut self) {
if self.height > 0 && (self.max_height < 6 || self.height >= self.max_height - 6) {
let header = create_dummy_header(self.header_hashes[self.height - 1].0, self.header_hashes[self.height].1);
self.manager.block_disconnected(&header, self.height as u32);
self.monitor.block_disconnected(&header, self.height as u32);
self.height -= 1;
let removal_height = self.height;
self.txids_confirmed.retain(|_, height| {
removal_height != *height
});
}
}
}
impl<'a> Drop for MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
fn drop(&mut self) {
if !::std::thread::panicking() {
// Disconnect all peers
for (idx, peer) in self.peers.borrow().iter().enumerate() {
if *peer {
self.handler.socket_disconnected(&Peer{id: idx as u8, peers_connected: &self.peers});
}
}
// Force all channels onto the chain (and time out claim txn)
self.manager.force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn();
}
}
}
struct KeyProvider {
node_secret: SecretKey,
inbound_payment_key: KeyMaterial,
counter: AtomicU64,
signer_state: RefCell<HashMap<u8, (bool, Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>)>>
}
impl EntropySource for KeyProvider {
fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
let ctr = self.counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
(ctr >> 8*7) as u8, (ctr >> 8*6) as u8, (ctr >> 8*5) as u8, (ctr >> 8*4) as u8, (ctr >> 8*3) as u8, (ctr >> 8*2) as u8, (ctr >> 8*1) as u8, 14, (ctr >> 8*0) as u8]
}
}
impl NodeSigner for KeyProvider {
fn get_node_id(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result<PublicKey, ()> {
let node_secret = match recipient {
Recipient::Node => Ok(&self.node_secret),
Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
}?;
Ok(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), node_secret))
}
fn ecdh(&self, recipient: Recipient, other_key: &PublicKey, tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> {
let mut node_secret = match recipient {
Recipient::Node => Ok(self.node_secret.clone()),
Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
}?;
if let Some(tweak) = tweak {
node_secret = node_secret.mul_tweak(tweak).map_err(|_| ())?;
}
Ok(SharedSecret::new(other_key, &node_secret))
}
fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial {
self.inbound_payment_key.clone()
}
fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {
unreachable!()
}
fn sign_bolt12_invoice_request(
&self, _invoice_request: &UnsignedInvoiceRequest
) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
unreachable!()
}
fn sign_bolt12_invoice(
&self, _invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice,
) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
unreachable!()
}
fn sign_gossip_message(&self, msg: lightning::ln::msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
let msg_hash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]).map_err(|_| ())?;
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
Ok(secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msg_hash, &self.node_secret))
}
}
impl SignerProvider for KeyProvider {
type EcdsaSigner = TestChannelSigner;
#[cfg(taproot)]
type TaprootSigner = TestChannelSigner;
fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
let ctr = self.counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) as u8;
self.signer_state.borrow_mut().insert(ctr, (inbound, Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new()))));
[ctr; 32]
}
fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
let ctr = channel_keys_id[0];
let (inbound, state) = self.signer_state.borrow().get(&ctr).unwrap().clone();
TestChannelSigner::new_with_revoked(if inbound {
InMemorySigner::new(
&secp_ctx,
SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, ctr]).unwrap(),
SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, ctr]).unwrap(),
SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, ctr]).unwrap(),
SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, ctr]).unwrap(),
SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, ctr]).unwrap(),
[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, ctr],
channel_value_satoshis,
channel_keys_id,
channel_keys_id,
)
} else {
InMemorySigner::new(
&secp_ctx,
SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, ctr]).unwrap(),
SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, ctr]).unwrap(),
SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, ctr]).unwrap(),
SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 10, ctr]).unwrap(),
SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11, ctr]).unwrap(),
[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 12, ctr],
channel_value_satoshis,
channel_keys_id,
channel_keys_id,
)
}, state, false)
}
fn read_chan_signer(&self, mut data: &[u8]) -> Result<TestChannelSigner, DecodeError> {
let inner: InMemorySigner = ReadableArgs::read(&mut data, self)?;
let state = Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new()));
Ok(TestChannelSigner::new_with_revoked(
inner,
state,
false
))
}
fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
}
fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1]).unwrap();
let pubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &secret_key).serialize());
Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash))
}
}
#[inline]
pub fn do_test(data: &[u8], logger: &Arc<dyn Logger>) {
let input = Arc::new(InputData {
data: data.to_vec(),
read_pos: AtomicUsize::new(0),
});
let fee_est = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator {
input: input.clone(),
});
let router = FuzzRouter {};
macro_rules! get_slice {
($len: expr) => {
match input.get_slice($len as usize) {
Some(slice) => slice,
None => return,
}
}
}
macro_rules! get_pubkey {
() => {
match PublicKey::from_slice(get_slice!(33)) {
Ok(key) => key,
Err(_) => return,
}
}
}
let our_network_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(get_slice!(32)) {
Ok(key) => key,
Err(_) => return,
};
let inbound_payment_key = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 42];
let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{ txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()) });
let monitor = Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(None, broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), fee_est.clone(),
Arc::new(TestPersister { update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed) })));
let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider {
node_secret: our_network_key.clone(),
inbound_payment_key: KeyMaterial(inbound_payment_key.try_into().unwrap()),
counter: AtomicU64::new(0),
signer_state: RefCell::new(HashMap::new())
});
let mut config = UserConfig::default();
config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = slice_to_be32(get_slice!(4));
config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = get_slice!(1)[0] != 0;
let network = Network::Bitcoin;
let best_block_timestamp = genesis_block(network).header.time;
let params = ChainParameters {
network,
best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
};
let channelmanager = Arc::new(ChannelManager::new(fee_est.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), &router, Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), config, params, best_block_timestamp));
// Adding new calls to `EntropySource::get_secure_random_bytes` during startup can change all the
// keys subsequently generated in this test. Rather than regenerating all the messages manually,
// it's easier to just increment the counter here so the keys don't change.
keys_manager.counter.fetch_sub(3, Ordering::AcqRel);
let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, Arc::clone(&logger)));
let gossip_sync = Arc::new(P2PGossipSync::new(Arc::clone(&network_graph), None, Arc::clone(&logger)));
let peers = RefCell::new([false; 256]);
let mut loss_detector = MoneyLossDetector::new(&peers, channelmanager.clone(), monitor.clone(), PeerManager::new(MessageHandler {
chan_handler: channelmanager.clone(),
route_handler: gossip_sync.clone(),
onion_message_handler: IgnoringMessageHandler {},
custom_message_handler: IgnoringMessageHandler {},
}, 0, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 15, 0], Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone()));
let mut should_forward = false;
let mut payments_received: Vec<PaymentHash> = Vec::new();
let mut payments_sent = 0;
let mut pending_funding_generation: Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, u64, ScriptBuf)> = Vec::new();
let mut pending_funding_signatures = HashMap::new();
loop {
match get_slice!(1)[0] {
0 => {
let mut new_id = 0;
for i in 1..256 {
if !peers.borrow()[i-1] {
new_id = i;
break;
}
}
if new_id == 0 { return; }
loss_detector.handler.new_outbound_connection(get_pubkey!(), Peer{id: (new_id - 1) as u8, peers_connected: &peers}, None).unwrap();
peers.borrow_mut()[new_id - 1] = true;
},
1 => {
let mut new_id = 0;
for i in 1..256 {
if !peers.borrow()[i-1] {
new_id = i;
break;
}
}
if new_id == 0 { return; }
loss_detector.handler.new_inbound_connection(Peer{id: (new_id - 1) as u8, peers_connected: &peers}, None).unwrap();
peers.borrow_mut()[new_id - 1] = true;
},
2 => {
let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
loss_detector.handler.socket_disconnected(&Peer{id: peer_id, peers_connected: &peers});
peers.borrow_mut()[peer_id as usize] = false;
},
3 => {
let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
match loss_detector.handler.read_event(&mut Peer{id: peer_id, peers_connected: &peers}, get_slice!(get_slice!(1)[0])) {
Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
Err(_) => { peers.borrow_mut()[peer_id as usize] = false; }
}
},
4 => {
let final_value_msat = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(get_pubkey!(), 42);
let params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
payment_params, final_value_msat);
let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
payment_hash.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&be64_to_array(payments_sent));
payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&payment_hash.0[..]).to_byte_array();
payments_sent += 1;
match channelmanager.send_payment(payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), params,
Retry::Attempts(0))
{
Ok(_) => {},
Err(_) => return,
}
},
15 => {
let final_value_msat = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(get_pubkey!(), 42);
let params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
payment_params, final_value_msat);
let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
payment_hash.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&be64_to_array(payments_sent));
payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&payment_hash.0[..]).to_byte_array();
payments_sent += 1;
let mut payment_secret = PaymentSecret([0; 32]);
payment_secret.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&be64_to_array(payments_sent));
payments_sent += 1;
match channelmanager.send_payment(payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
params, Retry::Attempts(0))
{
Ok(_) => {},
Err(_) => return,
}
},
5 => {
let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
let their_key = get_pubkey!();
let chan_value = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
let push_msat_value = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
if channelmanager.create_channel(their_key, chan_value, push_msat_value, 0, None, None).is_err() { return; }
},
6 => {
let mut channels = channelmanager.list_channels();
let channel_id = get_slice!(1)[0] as usize;
if channel_id >= channels.len() { return; }
channels.sort_by(|a, b| { a.channel_id.cmp(&b.channel_id) });
if channelmanager.close_channel(&channels[channel_id].channel_id, &channels[channel_id].counterparty.node_id).is_err() { return; }
},
7 => {
if should_forward {
channelmanager.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
should_forward = false;
}
},
8 => {
for payment in payments_received.drain(..) {
// SHA256 is defined as XOR of all input bytes placed in the first byte, and 0s
// for the remaining bytes. Thus, if not all remaining bytes are 0s we cannot
// fulfill this HTLC, but if they are, we can just take the first byte and
// place that anywhere in our preimage.
if &payment.0[1..] != &[0; 31] {
channelmanager.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment);
} else {
let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
payment_preimage.0[0] = payment.0[0];
channelmanager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
}
}
},
16 => {
let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
// Note that this may fail - our hashes may collide and we'll end up trying to
// double-register the same payment_hash.
let _ = channelmanager.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 1, None);
},
9 => {
for payment in payments_received.drain(..) {
channelmanager.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment);
}
},
10 => {
'outer_loop: for funding_generation in pending_funding_generation.drain(..) {
let mut tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
value: funding_generation.2, script_pubkey: funding_generation.3,
}] };
let funding_output = 'search_loop: loop {
let funding_txid = tx.txid();
if let None = loss_detector.txids_confirmed.get(&funding_txid) {
let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_txid, index: 0 };
for chan in channelmanager.list_channels() {
if chan.channel_id == outpoint.to_channel_id() {
tx.version += 1;
continue 'search_loop;
}
}
break outpoint;
}
tx.version += 1;
if tx.version > 0xff {
continue 'outer_loop;
}
};
if let Err(e) = channelmanager.funding_transaction_generated(&funding_generation.0, &funding_generation.1, tx.clone()) {
// It's possible the channel has been closed in the mean time, but any other
// failure may be a bug.
if let APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. } = e { } else { panic!(); }
}
pending_funding_signatures.insert(funding_output, tx);
}
},
11 => {
let mut txn = broadcast.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
if !txn.is_empty() {
loss_detector.connect_block(&txn[..]);
for _ in 2..100 {
loss_detector.connect_block(&[]);
}
}
for tx in txn.drain(..) {
loss_detector.funding_txn.push(tx);
}
},
12 => {
let txlen = slice_to_be16(get_slice!(2));
if txlen == 0 {
loss_detector.connect_block(&[]);
} else {
let txres: Result<Transaction, _> = deserialize(get_slice!(txlen));
if let Ok(tx) = txres {
let mut output_val = 0;
for out in tx.output.iter() {
if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { return; }
output_val += out.value;
if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { return; }
}
loss_detector.connect_block(&[tx]);
} else {
return;
}
}
},
13 => {
loss_detector.disconnect_block();
},
14 => {
let mut channels = channelmanager.list_channels();
let channel_id = get_slice!(1)[0] as usize;
if channel_id >= channels.len() { return; }
channels.sort_by(|a, b| { a.channel_id.cmp(&b.channel_id) });
channelmanager.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channels[channel_id].channel_id, &channels[channel_id].counterparty.node_id).unwrap();
},
// 15 is above
_ => return,
}
loss_detector.handler.process_events();
for event in loss_detector.manager.get_and_clear_pending_events() {
match event {
Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script, .. } => {
pending_funding_generation.push((temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script));
},
Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, .. } => {
//TODO: enhance by fetching random amounts from fuzz input?
payments_received.push(payment_hash);
},
Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {
should_forward = true;
},
_ => {},
}
}
}
}
pub fn full_stack_test<Out: test_logger::Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned(), out));
do_test(data, &logger);
}
#[no_mangle]
pub extern "C" fn full_stack_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned(), test_logger::DevNull {}));
do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, &logger);
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use lightning::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
struct TrackingLogger {
/// (module, message) -> count
pub lines: Mutex<HashMap<(String, String), usize>>,
}
impl Logger for TrackingLogger {
fn log(&self, record: Record) {
*self.lines.lock().unwrap().entry((record.module_path.to_string(), format!("{}", record.args))).or_insert(0) += 1;
println!("{:<5} [{} : {}, {}] {}", record.level.to_string(), record.module_path, record.file, record.line, record.args);
}
}
#[test]
fn test_no_existing_test_breakage() {
// To avoid accidentally causing all existing fuzz test cases to be useless by making minor
// changes (such as requesting feerate info in a new place), we run a pretty full
// step-through with two peers and HTLC forwarding here. Obviously this is pretty finicky,
// so this should be updated pretty liberally, but at least we'll know when changes occur.
// If nothing else, this test serves as a pretty great initial full_stack_target seed.
// What each byte represents is broken down below, and then everything is concatenated into
// one large test at the end (you want %s/ -.*//g %s/\n\| \|\t\|\///g).
// Following BOLT 8, lightning message on the wire are: 2-byte encrypted message length +
// 16-byte MAC of the encrypted message length + encrypted Lightning message + 16-byte MAC
// of the Lightning message
// I.e 2nd inbound read, len 18 : 0006 (encrypted message length) + 03000000000000000000000000000000 (MAC of the encrypted message length)
// Len 22 : 0010 00000000 (encrypted lightning message) + 03000000000000000000000000000000 (MAC of the Lightning message)
// Writing new code generating transactions and see a new failure ? Don't forget to add input for the FuzzEstimator !
// 0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - our network key
// 00000000 - fee_proportional_millionths
// 01 - announce_channels_publicly
//
// 00 - new outbound connection with id 0
// 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 - peer's pubkey
// 030032 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 50
// 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 03000000000000000000000000000000 - noise act two (0||pubkey||mac)
//
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
// 0010 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 16
// 030020 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 32
// 0010 00021aaa 0008aaaaaaaaaaaa9aaa 03000000000000000000000000000000 - init message (type 16) with static_remotekey required and other bits optional and mac
//
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
// 0147 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 327
// 0300fe - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 254
// 0020 6fe28c0ab6f1b372c1a6a246ae63f74f931e8365e15a089c68d6190000000000 ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679 000000000000c350 0000000000000000 0000000000000162 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000222 0000000000000000 000000fd 0006 01e3 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004 - beginning of open_channel message
// 030059 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 89
// 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005 020900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01 0000 01021000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - rest of open_channel and mac
//
// 00fd - Two feerate requests (all returning min feerate, which our open_channel also uses) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
// - client should now respond with accept_channel (CHECK 1: type 33 to peer 03000000)
//
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
// 0084 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 132
// 030094 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 148
// 0022 ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000210100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_created and mac
// - client should now respond with funding_signed (CHECK 2: type 35 to peer 03000000)
//
// 0c005e - connect a block with one transaction of len 94
// 020000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000ffffffff0150c3000000000000220020ae0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - the funding transaction
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
// - by now client should have sent a channel_ready (CHECK 3: SendChannelReady to 03000000 for chan 3d000000)
//
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
// 0043 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 67
// 030053 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 83
// 0024 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - channel_ready and mac
//
// 01 - new inbound connection with id 1
// 030132 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 50
// 0003000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000703000000000000000000000000000000 - inbound noise act 1
// 030142 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 66
// 000302000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000300000000000000000000000000000003000000000000000000000000000000 - inbound noise act 3
//
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
// 0010 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 16
// 030120 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 32
// 0010 00021aaa 0008aaaaaaaaaaaa9aaa 01000000000000000000000000000000 - init message (type 16) with static_remotekey required and other bits optional and mac
//
// 05 01 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00c350 0003e8 - create outbound channel to peer 1 for 50k sat
// 00fd - One feerate requests (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
//
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
// 0112 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 274
// 0301ff - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 255
// 0021 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e05 0000000000000162 00000000004c4b40 00000000000003e8 00000000000003e8 00000002 03f0 0005 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000300 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000400 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000500 02660000000000000000000000000000 - beginning of accept_channel
// 030123 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 35
// 0000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - rest of accept_channel and mac
//
// 0a - create the funding transaction (client should send funding_created now)
//
// 00fd00fd - Two feerate requests (calculating max dust exposure) (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
//
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
// 0062 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 98
// 030172 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 114
// 0023 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007c0001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_signed message and mac
//
// 0b - broadcast funding transaction
// - by now client should have sent a channel_ready (CHECK 4: SendChannelReady to 03020000 for chan 3f000000)
//
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
// 0043 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 67
// 030153 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 83
// 0024 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 026700000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - channel_ready and mac
//
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
// 05ac 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 1452
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
// 0080 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000003e80 ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000003f0 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000555 11 020203e8 0401a0 060800000e0000010000 0a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - beginning of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
// 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff ab00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
//
// 00fd - One feerate request (calculating max dust exposure) (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
//
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
// 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
// 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
// 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000300100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
// - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack and commitment_signed (CHECK 5/6: types 133 and 132 to peer 03000000)
//
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
// 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
// 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
// 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020b00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
//
// 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
// - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7: UpdateHTLCs event for node 03020000 with 1 HTLCs for channel 3f000000)
//
// 00fd00fd - Two feerate requests (calculating max dust exposure) (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
//
// - we respond with commitment_signed then revoke_and_ack (a weird, but valid, order)
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
// 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
// 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
// 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006a0001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
//
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
// 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
// 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
// 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6600000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 026400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
//
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
// 004a 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 74
// 03015a - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 90
// 0082 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000 ff00888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 01000000000000000000000000000000 - update_fulfill_htlc and mac
// - client should immediately claim the pending HTLC from peer 0 (CHECK 8: SendFulfillHTLCs for node 03000000 with preimage ff00888888 for channel 3d000000)
//
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
// 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
// 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
// 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
//
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
// 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
// 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
// 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6700000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 026500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
//
// - before responding to the commitment_signed generated above, send a new HTLC
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
// 05ac 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 1452
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
// 0080 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000003e80 ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000003f0 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000555 11 020203e8 0401a0 060800000e0000010000 0a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - beginning of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
// 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff ab00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
//
// 00fd - One feerate request (calculating max dust exposure) (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
//
// - now respond to the update_fulfill_htlc+commitment_signed messages the client sent to peer 0
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
// 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
// 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
// 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
// - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack and commitment_signed (CHECK 5/6 duplicates)
//
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
// 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
// 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
// 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000c30100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
//
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
// 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
// 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
// 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0b00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
//
// 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
// - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7 duplicate)
// - we respond with revoke_and_ack, then commitment_signed, then update_fail_htlc
//
// 00fd00fd - Two feerate requests (calculating max dust exposure) (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
//
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
// 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
// 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
// 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000390001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
//
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
// 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
// 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
// 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 027000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
//
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
// 002c 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 44
// 03013c - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 60
// 0083 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - update_fail_htlc and mac
//
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
// 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
// 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
// 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000390001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
//
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
// 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
// 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
// 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 027100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
//
// 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
// - client now sends id 0 update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 9)
// - now respond to the update_fail_htlc+commitment_signed messages the client sent to peer 0
//
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
// 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99